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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Scholarly criticism and case law are beginning to reflect the notion that
quasi in rem jurisdiction is unnecessary except in those cases where it is
unfair to assert it. The rapid expansion of inpersonam jurisdiction via the
International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine and subsequent long-arm
statutes provide state courts with considerable latitude in the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction. Where a plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant
has these minimum contacts with the forum state, the claim can be more
fairly litigated elsewhere. In fact, without such minimal contacts, defendant
should not be forced to bring his evidence and witnesses to a forum and
litigate an unrelated claim.
Where a defendant does not have the requisite contacts with the forum
state, and the property over which quasi in rem jurisdiction is asserted is an
intangible, the potential unfairness to a defendant is even greater. If widely
adopted, the Seider rule would subject the defendant to nationwide service
of process. The only limitation on the assertion of jurisdiction would be the
happenstance of whether defendant's insurance company did business in
the forum, with a possible limitation of such jurisdiction to residents of the
state or nonresidents whose cause of action arose within the state. As a
result, the Gregg decision, although perhaps a misapplication of the prefer-
red view, represents progressive application of the minimum contacts
doctrine fully warranted by considerations of fair play and substantial
justice.
RUSSELL L. WEAVER




Robert Cuffee lived with Belmira Lucas from 1948 through 1966 but
they were never married. They had two children, Ruby Marie Lucas born
in 1953 and Darin Edward Lucas born in 1960. In 1966, Robert Cuffee
separated from the children's mother and moved to Rhode Island where
he died in 1968. Ms. Lucas applied for child insurance benefits2 for Ruby
and Darin. Although establishing paternity, the children were able to prove
1. 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976), revg Lucas v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
390 F. Supp. 1310 (D.R.I. 1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970), Social Security Act § 202 provides:
(d)(1) Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an individu-
al entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or of an individual
who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child-. ...
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RECENT CASES
neither dependency on Robert Cuffee at the time of his death nor applica-
bility of any of the statutory presumptions of dependency. Consequently
their application for benefits was denied.
The Social Security Act states that a child of an insured individual is
entitled to surviving child's benefits if the child is under 18, or a student
under 22,3 and was dependent at the time of the parent's death.4 A
legitimate or an adopted child is presumed dependent under the Act.5 This
presumption of dependency extends to an illegitimate child if under state
law he is able to inherit intestate from the insured parent.6 Further statu-
tory classifications presume dependency of an illegitimate child if his pa-
rent had gone through a marriage ceremony which was invalid for some
obvious legal defect, 7 or the father s had acknowledged his paternity in
3. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B) (1970), Social Security Act § 202(d)(l)(B)(i).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (1970), Social Security Act § 202(d)(1) provides:
(C) was dependent upon such individual-
(i) if such individual is living, at the time such application was filed,
(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death, or
(iii) if such individual had a period of disability which continued until
he became entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or (if he has
died) until the month of his death, at the beginning of such period of
disability or at the time he became entitled to such benefits, shall be
entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the
first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (1970), Social Security Act § 202 provides:
(d)(3) A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting
father or his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in para-
graph (1)(C) of this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not
living with or contributing to the support of such child and-
(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such indi-
vidual, or for purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be a child of a
fully or currently insured individual pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or
section 416(h)(3) of this title shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of
such individual.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970), Social Security Act § 216(h)(2) provides:
(A) In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a
fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the
devolution of interstate personal property by the courts of the State in
which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files
application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State
in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured
individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the
District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the
name status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or
parent shall be deemed such.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (1970), Social Security Act § 216(h)(2) provides:
(B) If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently
insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such
insured individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant shall neverthe-
less be deemed to be the child or such insured individual if such insured
individual and the mother or father, as the case may be, of such applicant
19771
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
writing, or a court had decreed paternity, or a court order had required the
father to support the child. 9 If the applicant does not qualify as a depen-
dent under one of the classifications, he must show that at the time of
death, the parent was living with or contributing to the support of the
applicant. 10
There has been disagreement over the legislative purpose of the Act.
In Norton v. Weinberger,I a federal district court decided that Congress
intended to provide benefits only when there is actual support lost to a
child when his parent dies. The federal court in Rhode Island hearing the
Lucas case 12 concluded the Congressional purpose of the Act was to pro-
vide benefits as a substitute for the right of support lost by a child when his
parent dies13 and not to replace only the actual support lost.
went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage
between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the last
sentence of paragraph (1)(B), would have been a valid marriage.
8. The statutory classifications are written in sex-neutral language except §
416(h)(3)(C)(i) which deals only with a presumption of dependency based on
paternity. It is not clear whether a child would be presumed dependent on the
wage-earning mother based on a written acknowledgement of maternity or if the
child would have to prove support or cohabitation at the time of death of the
mother to be eligible for benefits. Possibly, mere proof of maternity may be
accepted as being conclusive of maternal dependency.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i) (1970), Social Security Act § 216(h) provides:
(3) An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently
insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of
such insured individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall
nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual if:
(C) in the case of a deceased individual-
(i) such insured individual-
(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son
or daughter,
(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the
applicant, or
(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support
of the applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter,
and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was
made before the death of such insured individual ....
10. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) (1970), Social Security Act § 216(h)(3)(C)
provides:
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the
Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured
individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at
the time such insured individual died.
11. 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 902
(1974), reaffirmed, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Norton v.
Mathews, 96 S. Ct. 2771 (1976).
12. 390 F. Supp. 1310 (D.R.I. 1975).
13. Id. at 1320. The District Court of Rhode Island concluded that the
decision in Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) was inconsistent with the
notion that the primary purpose of the Social Security Act was to replace only the
actual support lost by the child at the time of his father's disability. Similar language
is used in various federal and state legislation for the purpose of presuming
[Vol. 42
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The Supreme Court has held that a child's right to financial support by
his father cannot be conditioned on his legitimacy. 4 By concluding the
purpose of the Act was to provide benefits as a substitute for the right of
support lost, the District Court of Rhode Island decided that the purpose
would be satisfied by proof of paternity alone without regard to whether or
not the child was supported by or lived with his father. The court further
decided that the additional requirements of cohabitation or support which
must be established by an illegitimate child not presumed dependent under
the Act do nothing to further the purpose of the Act and are merely a
reflection of society's view that a legitimate child is more deserving of
support than an illegitimate child. The District Court of Rhode Island held
in the Lucas case that the denial of benefits to the applicants violated the
fifth amendment's Due Process Clause because other children including all
legitimate children were statutorily entitled to benefits regardless of the
absence of support or cohabitation.
The Supreme Court reversed. After studying the legislative history of
the Act, the Court concluded that it was intended to replace only the actual
support lost by a child when his parent dies. The Court continued that the
Act was not "impermissibly discriminating in providing only for those
children for whom the loss of a parent is an immediate source of need"' 5
and that the statute's matrix of classifications bore a reasonable relationship
to actual dependency at death.
The fifth 16 and fourteenth 17 amendments to the Constitution prohibit
federal or state discrimination which results in the denial of equal protec-
tion. Under the mere rational basis test, statutory classifications do not
deny equal protection provided that they are rationally related to a legiti-
mate state concern.1 8 However, when the classification impairs a funda-
mental right 9 or discriminates on the basis of race20 or other classifications
the Court has deemed "suspect," 21 the judicial scrutiny transcends the
rational basis standard and the discrimination must be justified as neces-
sary to promote a "compelling state interest."
22
The Lucas Court rejected the argument that classifications treating
paternity and not dependency. See, e.g., Uniform Paternity Act, 38 U.S.C. § 101(4)
(1970) (veteran's benefits).
14. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam). The Court invali-
dated a Texas law which denied to illegitimate children the right to paternal
support while granting that right to all legitimate children.
15. 96 S. Ct. at 2763.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Equal protection incorporated via Due Process
Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel).
20. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
21. Alienage and national origin have also been held to be suspect classifica-
tions. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
22. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
1977]
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently are constitutionally sus-
pect.23 Earlier cases had not reached this question 24 but appeared to use a
higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis. 25 Seven times in the last
decade the Court has invalidated federal and state legislation that imposed
disabilities on the illegitimate child.26 Only once did the Court uphold
discrimination against the illegitimate child. In Labine v. Vincent27 the
Court refused to strike down state legislation which denied an illegitimate
child the right to inherit intestate from his father. The most puzzing aspect
of the Labine case was the Court's use of rational basis as the standard of
review. 28 The reasons given for the Labine decision were that a state had a
legitimate interest in regulating titles and there was an absence of a total
bar to the illegitimate child as he could have inherited if named in his
father's will.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,29 decided in 1972, was an attempt
by the Court to establish guidelines for deciding whether classifications
based on illegitimacy are violative of equal protection. According to W ber,
the inquiry is a dual one: "What legitimate interest does the classification
promote? What fundmental personal rights might the classification en-
danger?"30 This balancing test appears to require more than a mere ration-
al basis because it takes into account factors other than the state's interest.
The test falls short of requiring the highest level of judicial scrutiny
because the balancing factors could weigh in favor of the state absent a
compelling state interest. The end result of this balancing test is a middle
level of review in which the Court apparently requires a reasonable rela-
tionship between the classifications based on legitimacy and the state's
reason for using it.
3
'
23. 96 S. Ct. at 2761, 2762. The Court recognized that illegitimacy, like race
or national origin, is beyond the control of the illegitimate and that such discrimina-
tion is often illogical and unjust. But the Court refused to elevate illegitimacy to a
suspect class as some classifications based on legitimacy may be rational. The Court
added that discrimination against illegitimacy has never historically approached the
severity of racial discrimination.
24. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1974).
25. See generally Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 479
(1974).
26. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069, affg mem. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D.
Md. 1972); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069, affig mem. 342 F. Supp. 588 (D.
Conn. 1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968). See generally Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, supra note 25.
27. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
28. Id. at 538.
29. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). The Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that
discriminated against illegitimate children in workmen's compensation benefits.
30. 406 U.S. at 173.
31. Various commentators have recognized a middle level of scrutiny some-
where between rational and compelling and have labeled the level as one requiring
(Vol. 42
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The Lucas Court ended speculation that illegitimacy might be a sus-
pect class but seemed to stop short of dropping the level of protection
down to a mere rational basis. Although it cited Labine as controlling, the
Court indicated that the Weber balancing test, not mere rational basis, was
the analytical tool used in sustaining the legislation. Labine was controlling
merely to the extent that Lucas also involved a fact situation in which the
discrimination did not pose an absolute bar and was related to a valid
governmental interest. The Court concluded that "the statutory classifica-
tions are permissible . . .because they are reasonably related to the likeli-
hood of dependency at death.3 2
The Court's determination that the classifications reasonably further
legislative purpose is open to question. The classifications do not differen-
tiate on the criteria of dependency at the time of death. 33 In their appli-
cation, an actual showing of dependency is a prerequisite for only one
class.34 In their effect, benefits are received by many children not depen-
dent on their wage-earning parent at the time of death.
Administrative convenience was used to justify the fact that the classes
presumed dependent were overinclusive. The Court did not consider
other means of eliminating the onerous task of case by case determinations
of dependency. For example, Congress could have presumed dependency
for only those children residing with their fathers at the time of death or
having a court decree of child support. All others could still qualify by an
actual showing of support. This presumption would be closer to Congress'
intent in replacing only support actually lost to the child by the death of his
father3 5 without classifying on the basis of legitimacy.
The Court declared that the factors that give rise to the presumption
of dependency, such as legitimacy, a written acknowledgement of paterni-
ty, and the ability to inherit intestate, do not lack a substantial relation to
the liklihood of actual dependency. But the requirement is dependency at
the time of death. A written acknowledgement of paternity some time in the
past would seem to have only a tenuous connection with dependency at the
time of death. Living in a state in which an illegitimate child is able to
inherit intestate appears to have no relationship at all with the likelihood of
reasonableness. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword, In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1972). Gunther states that the Court is now applying a
means-focused equal protection scrutiny which is more demanding than the tradi-
tional rational basis test. See also Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, supra note 25
at 482-85. A standard of reasonableness which is somewhat more demanding than
the traditional standard under equal protection was established in Weber.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 2764 (emphasis added).
33. See statute cited notes 3-7, 9 supra.
34. See statute cited note 10, supra.
35. See Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973). Eighty-two percent
of legitimate children do not receive support from their absent fathers compared
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dependency at the time of death. Even the presumption that a legitimate
child is dependent on his father is ignoring the reality of the high divorce
rate and the low percentage of child support contributed by absent
fathers. 6
Through legislation, Missouri 37 could offset the discriminatory effect
of the child insurance benefits provision of the Social Security Act upheld
in Mathews v. Lucas. Illegitimate children whose deceased fathers last re-
sided in Missouri would be presumed dependent 38 if Missouri would
change its intestate inheritance law that presently does not allow an illegiti-
mate child to inherit intestate from his natural father.39 However, judicial
action alone may provide a remedy to securing child insurance benefits for
the illegitimate not presumed nor actually dependent through Missouri's
very liberal equitable adoption decree.4" A Missouri court of equity will decree
adoption to protect the interest of a child when the adopting parent has
expressly agreed to adopt, or by his acts and conduct has placed himself in
a position where it would be inequitable to permit it to be asserted that the
child was not adopted.4' The acts and conduct upon which the Missouri
courts have repeatedly placed great emphasis are taking the child into the
adopting parent's house42 and obtaining from the child the love, affection,
companionship and services which ordinarily accrue to a parent.4 3 The
doctrine is limited to those cases in which equity and justice would in no
other way be served, upon proof that the adopted child is actually and
equitably entitled to such relief.44 One who seeks to establish an equitable
adoption by estoppel must produce clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence.4- The decree, although not putting the adopted child in quite the
same status as one legally adopted, will allow the child to inherit from the
36. Id. at 306.
37. See MISSOURI CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MISSOURI VITAL STATIS-
tics 1974 (1975). In 1974 9,795 illegitimate children were born in Missouri. This
totals almost 18% of the total births in the state. In the City of St. Louis, over 64% of
the non-white children born in 1974 were illegitimate.
38. See statute cited note 6, supra.
39. Banks v. Galbraith, 149 Mo. 529, 51 S.W. 105 (1899); Baker v. Stucker,
213 Mo. App. 245, 248 S.W. 1003 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923).
40. Stanley v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 793 (W.D.
Mo. 1973). See also Cowherd, Rights of Illegitimate Children in Missouri, 40 Mo. L.
REv. 631 (1975).
41. Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1957); Capps v. Adamson, 362
Mo. 539, 242 S.W.2d 556 (1951); Drake v. Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S.W.2d 556 (En
Banc 1931); Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974).
42. Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1957).
43. Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940, 38 S.W.2d 1055 (1931).
44. Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81, 88-89 (Mo. 1957); Hogane v. Otter-
bach, 269 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1954); Rich v. Baer, 361 Mo. 1048, 238 S.W.2d 408 (1951);
Menees v. Cowgill, 359 Mo. 697, 223 S.W.2d 412 (1949). Holloway v. Jones, 246
S.W. 587 (Mo. 1922). See also Gardner, Equitable Adoption in Missouri, 20 Mo. L.
REV. 199 (1955).
45. Long v. Willey, 391 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1965).
[Vol. 42
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estate of the adopted parent. 46
The doctrine has been used primarily in suits to name the equitably
adopted child as a lawful heir of the deceased adoptive parent. 47 In Stanley
v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare4" the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri49 held that a child who met the requirements
of equitable adoption was eligible for child insurance benefits as a legally
adopted child of the wage earner. A legally adopted child is conclusively
presumed dependent.5 0 There have been several Missouri cases in which
an illegitimate child was held to be equitably adopted by his natural father
in actions against the deceased father's estate.5 Extending the illegitimate
child's claim of equitable adoption by his natural father to an action for
child insurance benefits would be the next logical step.
52
In Mathews v. Lucas, the reasonable level of scrutiny utilized through
the Weber balancing test provided the illegitimate with virtually no more
protection that a mere rational basis test would have provided. The practi-
cal result of Mathews v. Lucas may be an increased use by state and federal
legislators of classifications based on legitimacy in efforts to serve adminis-
46. Lukas v. Hays, 283 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1955); Thomas v. Malone, 142 Mo.
App. 193, 126 S.W. 522 (K.C. Mo. App. 1910).
47. See Cowherd, supra note 40; see also Gardner, supra note 44.
48. 356 F. Supp. at 803, provides in pertinent part:
Therefore, as an aid to achievement of the Congressional purpose and
objective of the Social Security Act, Section 402 (d)(9)(B) will be liberally
construed so that narrow technical views will not be employed to impede
or prevent the accomplishment of the legislative intent that children other-
wise qualified . . . receive child insurance benefits when the evidence
clearly shows that the adoptive parent did not adopt the child. . . solely to
qualify the child for child insurance benefits.
49. The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri came to the same
result in Watermon v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 342 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.
Mo. 1972).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (1970), Social Security Act § 202(d)(3)(A).
51. McCary v. McCary, 239 S.W. 848 (Mo. 1922); Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d
561 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974).
52. A number of doctrines which should be advantageous for the child claim-
ing equitable adoption have been developed under Missouri case law. A subsequent
estrangement between the child and the adopting parent has no effect once an
agreement to adopt has been reached. See Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d at 565-66. It is
unnecessary that the word "adopt" should be used in connection with the incurring
of such liability and maintenance of the relation may of itself be sufficient evidence,
in equity, upon which to rest the resulting obligation. Id. at 567.
Another advantage of equitable adoption is that it needs no formal court
decree. The facts themselves constitute the equitable adoption. Thus an affidavit
reciting the facts of the equitable adoption should be included with the illegitimate
child's application for child insurance benefits. Whether or not the stated facts
constituted an equitable adoption under Missouri law initially would be a decision
for the Social Security Administration. See Stanley v. Secretary af Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 793, 800 (W.D. Mo. 1973). It should be emphasized that this
doctrine would seem to have applicability only when there was co-habitation be-
tween parent and child, even if it were for only a short period of time.
1977]
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